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Abstract
This article identifies a new channel through which inflation aﬀects the real economy.
In a simple monetary model where agents face heterogenous income flows, it is proven that
credit constraints create heterogeneity in money demand. Because of this heterogeneity,
long run inflation aﬀects the real interest rate and real variables, even when there are no
redistributive eﬀects, no distorting fiscal policy, no substitution between leisure and working
time, and when prices are flexible. For realistic utility functions, inflation is found to raise
the capital stock, but to decrease welfare.
Keywords : Inflation, Credit Constraints, Heterogenous Agents
JEL Classification Numbers: E50
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1 Introduction
This paper shows the existence of a new channel through which inflation aﬀects the real
economy based only on financial market imperfections. It is shown that inflation aﬀects
capital accumulation and welfare inequality in the long run if credit constraints are binding
for some agents. The reason for this result is that credit constraints create an heterogeneity
in agents’ reaction facing a change in inflation. If money is held because it provides some
liquidity services, unconstrained agents substitute money by financial assets when inflation
increases. However, constrained agents, who also hold money because of liquidity services,
can not change their demand for financial assets when inflation changes. Thus, the change
in their real money holdings is diﬀerent from the one of unconstrained agents. Hence,
financial market imperfections are enough to yield heterogeneity in money demand, without
any assumptions on heterogeneity in preferences or in transaction technologies. Because of
this heterogeneity, inflation has a real eﬀect in the long run. This eﬀect is diﬀerent from
previous eﬀects stemming from redistribution between generations as in Weiss [15] or Weil
[14] or between households as in Kehoe et al. [10], or because of an eﬀect of inflation on
distorting taxes (e.g. Phelps [11] Chari et al., [5]) or on labor supply.
This result is obtained within a simple liquidity constrained model. In such models,
heterogenous agents face idiosyncratic income shocks and are unable to borrow as much as
they would like in the loan markets. Contrary to previous general equilibrium of money,
such as Gandmont and Younes [6], this type of model drastically simplifies the heterogeneity
across agents to be able to derive analytical properties of the equilibrium. Such models have
been used to study the demand for fiat money in Bewley [2], the eﬀect of public debt in
Woodford [16], the redistributive eﬀect of inflation Kehoe et al. [10] and the property of the
stochastic steady states (e.g. Kehoe and Levine [9]). However, they have not been used to
study substitution between money and financial titles, which is at the core of this paper.
Indeed, I assume that money yields liquidity services and enters the utility function. Because
of this, both money and interest bearing financial titles are held in equilibrium.
First, it is shown that even if the new money is distributed to private agents by lump-sum
transfers proportionally to their money holdings, money is not superneutral and inflation af-
fects the real interest rate. This result is obtained with an inelastic labor supply and without
distorting taxes, to ensure that other mechanisms through which inflation could aﬀect the
real equilibrium are absent. Second, it is shown that inflation increases capital accumulation
for realistic values of the elasticity of substitution between money and consumption, what
is consistent with empirical evidence on the eﬀect of low inflation (e.g. Bullard and Keating
[3]). As a consequence, as binding credit constraints are a well established fact (e.g. Jappelli
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[8] among others) the eﬀect of inflation stemming from this channel may be crucial to assess
the long run eﬀect of inflation. In a simple calibration exercise, an increase in inflation from
2% to 3% is found to increase the capital stock, but to decrease welfare.
The paper is presented in 5 other sections. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
derives the stationary equilibria. Section 4 derives analytically the equilibrium. Section 5
provides additional results with further specifications of the utility function.
2 The Environment
There is an infinite number of discrete time periods t = 1, ... In each period, there is a
continuum of length 1 of two types of households i = 1, 2. The households can be in two
states, H or L, and they switch deterministically from state H to state L and from state
L to state H. They sell inelastically one unit of labor in state H and they sell no labor in
state L. Type 1 households are in state H and type 2 households are in state L in period 1.
As a consequence, if eit denotes the quantity of labor sold by type i households in period t,
eit follows the simple law for t = 1, 2..., e
i
t+1 = 0 if e
i
t = 1 and e
i
t+1 = 1 if e
i
t = 0, the initial
states being e11 = 1 and e
2
1 = 0.
The commodities in this economy are labor, a consumption-capital good and money.
Money is assumed to yield liquidity services and it is thus demanded although it is dominated
by interest bearing financial assets. I follow a long tradition by assuming that money enters
the utility function. As a consequence, the utility of a type i household in period t, depends
on the quantity of final goods consumed, cit, and of the real quantity of money held at the
end of period t, denoted mit. The households have a common additively separable utility
function u such that the total utility derived from the vector of positive values of consumption
and money holdings {(ci1,mi1), (ci2,mi2), ...} is
P∞
t=1 β
t−1u
¡
cit,m
i
t
¢
with 0 < β < 1. To
provide analytical results on the existence of credit constrained equilibrium in this monetary
framework, I assume that the period utility function has a constant elasticity of substitution
between consumption and money:
u (c,m) =
1
1− σ
∙³
ωc
η−1
η + (1− ω)m
η−1
η
´ η
η−1
¸1−σ
0 < ω < 1 (1)
u (c,m) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable for σ > 0, σ 6= 1 and for η > 0, η 6= 1. But,
using the standard assumption that the term inside the bracket is equal to cωm1−ω when
η = 1 and that 11−σ (.)
1−σ ≡ ln (.) when σ = 1, the previous utility function can be defined
for σ, η > 0.
In each period t, Pt denotes the monetary price of the final good in period t, and Πt+1
is the gross inflation rate between period t and period t+ 1, that is Πt+1 = Pt+1/Pt. With
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their revenue in period t ≥ 1, each type i household buys an amount cit of final goods, he
buys an amount ait+1 of financial titles, which yield Rt+1a
i
t+1 in period t + 1, where Rt+1
is the gross real interest rate between period t and period t + 1. A borrowing constraint
is introduced in its simplest form, and I assume that households can not borrow, ait ≥ 0.
Finally, type i household buys a nominal quantity of money M it , which corresponds to real
balances mit = M
i
t/Pt. It yields a revenue m
i
t/Πt+1 in period t + 1. Indeed, the nominal
value of money transferred to period t+ 1 is Ptmit and its period t+ 1 value is Ptm
i
t/Pt+1.
Labor income of household i in period t is wteit, where wt denotes the real wage expressed
in final good. In addition to labor and capital income, each household receives by helicopter
drops a monetary transfer from the State, denoted µit in nominal terms. The problem of the
type i household, i = 1, 2, is
max
{cit,mit,ait+1}t=1..∞
∞X
t=1
βt−1u
¡
cit,m
i
t
¢
with 0 < β < 1 (2)
s.t. cit +m
i
t + a
i
t+1 = Rta
i
t +
mit−1
Πt
+ wteit +
µit
Pt
with ait, c
i
t,m
i
t ≥ 0 (3)
with ai1 and M
i
0 = P0m
i
0 given, and subject to the standard transversality conditions for a
i
t
and mit.
The production function of the representative firm has a simple Cobb-Douglas form
KαL1−α where L is total labor and K is total capital which fully depreciates in produc-
tion, and which must be installed one period before production. Profit maximization is
maxKt,Lt K
αL1−α −RtKt − wtLt and the standard first order conditions are
Rt = αK
α−1
t L
1−α
t , wt = (1− α)Kαt L−αt (4)
In period t ≥ 1, the financial market equilibrium isKt+1 = a1t+1+a2t+1. The labor market
equilibrium is Lt = e1t+e
2
t = 1. The goods market equilibrium is F (Kt, Lt) = Kt+1+c
1
t+c
2
t .
Finally, I denote M¯t the nominal quantity of money in circulation and Σt the real quantity
of money in circulation at the end of period t, Σt = M¯t/Pt. The money market equilibrium
is thus m1t +m
2
t = Σt in real terms and M
1
t +M
2
t = M¯t in nominal terms.
Monetary authorities give a new nominal quantity of money in period t, which is pro-
portional to the nominal quantity of money in circulation at the end of period t − 1. As a
consequence, µ1t +µ
2
t = πM¯t−1 where the initial nominal quantity of money, M¯0 =M
1
0 +M
2
0
is given. The law of motion of the nominal quantity of money is thus
M¯t = (1 + π) M¯t−1 (5)
Throughout the paper, it is assumed that monetary authorities follow the “most” neutral
rule, which is to distribute by lump sum transfer the exact amount of resources paid by
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private agents because of the inflation tax. As a consequence, the new money is distributed
proportionally to the beginning of period money balances. In period t, type i agents have
a beginning of period quantity of money M it−1. hence, I assume that µ
i
t = πM
i
t−1, and the
real transfer is
µit
Pt
=
π
Πt
mit−1 (6)
Given initial conditions a11, a
2
1, M
1
0 , and M
2
1 , and given π, an equilibrium of this econ-
omy is a sequence {c1t , c2t ,m1t ,m2t , a1t+1, a2t+1, Pt, Rt, wt}t=1...∞ which satisfies the problem of
households (2), the first order condition of the problem of the firms (4), and the diﬀerent
market equilibria. More precisely, I focus on symmetric stationary equilibria1, where all real
variables are constant, and where all households in each state H and L have the same con-
sumption and savings levels. The variables describing households in state H will be denoted
mH , cH , aH , and households in state L will be described bymL, cL, aL. As a consequence, as
the real quantity of money in circulation Σ = M¯t/Pt is constant in a stationary equilibrium,
equality (5) implies that the price of the final goods grow at a rate π, and hence Π = 1+ π.
3 Stationary Equilibrium
With the budget constraint (3), and the amount µit/Pt given by (6), one finds that the
budget constraint of H and L households is respectively
cH +mH + aH = RaL +mL + w (7)
cL +mL + aL = RaH +mH (8)
Note that the inflation rate does not appear in these equations because the creation of new
money does not introduce any transfer between the two types of households.
Using standard dynamic programming arguments, the problem of the households can be
solved easily. This is done in appendix A. For H agents, one finds the following optimal
conditions
u0c
¡
cH ,mH
¢
= βRu0c
¡
cL,mL
¢
(9)
u0c
¡
cH ,mH
¢
− u0m
¡
cH ,mH
¢
=
β
Π
u0c
¡
cL,mL
¢
(10)
The first equation is the Euler equation for H agents, who can smooth their utility thanks
to positive savings. Indeed, H agents are the high income agents and are never credit
constrained. The second equality is the arbitrage equation, which determines the demand
1 In liquidity constraint models, the path of the economy converges toward a steady state, or even begins
at a steady state if a period 1 transfer is made to households consistently with steady state values (Kehoe
and Levine, 2001)
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for real money balances. H agents equalize the marginal cost of holding money in the current
period, (i.e. the left hand side of equation 10), to the marginal gain of transferring one unit
of money to the following period where they are in state L, (i.e. the right hand side of
equation 10). The marginal utility of money appears here as a decrease in the opportunity
cost of holding money, and the gain of money holdings takes into account the real return on
money 1/Π.
The solution of the program of L households depends on the credit constraints being
binding or not. If credit constraints are binding , the solution is aL = 0 and
u0c
¡
cL,mL
¢
> βRu0c
¡
cH ,mH
¢
(11)
u0c
¡
cL,mL
¢
− u0m
¡
cL,mL
¢
=
β
Π
u0c
¡
cH ,mH
¢
(12)
The first inequality stipulates that L agents would be better oﬀ in they could transfer some
income from the next period toward the current one. The second equality is the same trade-
oﬀ as the one of H households. Finally, if credit constraints do not bind for L households,
the inequality (11) becomes an equality and aL > 0.
Using expression (9) together with condition (11), one finds that credit constraints are
binding if and only if R < 1/β. If credit constraints do not bind, equalities (9) and (11)
with equality directly yield R = 1/β. The following proposition summarizes this standard
result.
Proposition 1 Credit constraints are binding for L agents if and only if R < 1/β. If credit
constraints do not bind then R = 1/β.
When credit constraints are binding, the gross real interest rate R is lower than the
inverse of the discount factor. As a consequence, there is always capital over-accumulation
because of the precautionary motive to save, which is is a standard result in this type of
liquidity constrained models (e.g. Woodford [15]; Kehoe and Levine [8]). When credit
constraints do not bind, the inflation rate does not aﬀect the long run real interest rate. In
this case, monetary variables only are aﬀected by inflation.
Conditions on the parameters of the model
R can not be lower than 1/Π in equilibrium, otherwise the return on money would be
higher than the return on financial titles and the financial market could not clear. As a
consequence, a equilibrium with binding credit constraints can exist only if 1/Π < 1/β.
Moreover, I assume that the surplus left for consumption, F (K) − K is positive at the
Friedman rule, that is when R = 1/Π. With the Cobb-Douglas production function, this
condition implies α < 1/Π. Thus, I assume that the following inequalities, which are fulfilled
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for realistic values of the parameters, are satisfied.
α <
1
Π
<
1
β
4 Credit Constrained Equilibria
This section presents suﬃcient condition for a credit constrained equilibrium to exist and
proves that inflation is not neutral in such an equilibrium. When credit constraints bind,
that is when R < 1β , one finds, dividing (10) by (9) and using (9) with (12), together with
the expression of the utility function:
mH
cH
=
µ
1− ω
ω
¶η µ
1− 1
ΠR
¶−η
and
mL
cL
=
µ
1− ω
ω
¶η µ
1− β
2R
Π
¶−η
(13)
For the H households, the ratio of money over consumption is determined by preference
parameters and by the opportunity cost to hold money. To see this, assume that R and Π
are close to unity, then 1− 1/ΠR ' (R− 1)− (1−Π), which is the diﬀerence between the
real net return on financial titles and the real net return on money or, in other words, which
is the nominal interest rate.
The equilibrium ratio for L agents is not simply determined by the opportunity cost
to hold money, but by the diﬀerence between consumption in the current period and the
return on money holdings two periods ahead. Indeed, the ratio β2R/Π is the discounted
value of one unit of money held in state L, transferred in state H, and then saved on
financial market to the next period, where the household is in state L again. When this ratio
increases, L households increase the ratio of their money holdings over their consumption.
As a consequence, state L households increase the relative demand for money when the real
interest increases, contrary to state H households. Indeed, the real interest rate appears as
the remuneration of future savings and not as the opportunity cost to hold money.
It is now possible to derive the conditions for the existence of a stationary equilibrium
with binding credit constraints. The proof of the following propositions are left in appendix.
Proposition 2 An equilibrium with binding credit constraints exists if 1) α < 12+β and 2)
η 6= 1 and either η < 1 or η < 1σ . In such an equilibrium inflation has an eﬀect on real
variables.
Condition 1) stipulates that the capital share in production α must not be too high or,
conversely, that the labor income earned by H agents must be high enough. This condition
ensures that H agents have the incentives to smooth consumption in equilibrium. This
condition is fulfilled for the standard value α = 13 and β < 1. Condition 2) states that the
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elasticity of substitution between money and consumption must not be too high. Otherwise,
H agents would demand a little amount of final goods, and would use money both to derive
utility and to smooth consumption. In this case, they could transfer enough resources in
state L, such that they would never face binding credit constraints. This proposition does
not guarantee uniqueness, and does not consider the Cobb-Douglas case which is analyzed
below.
The second part of the proposition proves that inflation is not neutral when credit con-
straints are binding. The reason for this result is that one can show that ∂m
H
∂Π 6= ∂m
L
∂Π
under the conditions of proposition 2. Indeed, money is the only store of value for L agents,
whereas H agents can substitute money for financial assets when inflation varies. This yields
a diﬀerence in the reaction of agents’ facing a change in inflation.
When credit constraints do not bind, the result of Sidrauski [12] is obtained because
agents react symmetrically to a change in inflation. Indeed, in this case, ∂m
H
∂Π =
∂mL
∂Π .
5 Further Specifications
5.1 The Cobb-Douglas Utility function
The Cobb-Douglas utility function u (c,m) =
¡
cωm1−ω
¢1−σ
/ (1− σ) is often used in macro-
economics and it can find some empirical support (Holman [7]). In this case it is possible to
determine the eﬀect of inflation on capital accumulation.
Proposition 3 If α < 12+β , there is a unique equilibrium with credit constraints and
∂R
∂Π < 0.
Inflation favors capital accumulation and output. Indeed, the L households lower less
rapidly their money holdings mL than H households, because money is their only store of
value. As a consequence, H households have more resources to save and consume when
inflation increases. Indeed, their budget constraints yields cH + aH = w + mL − mH .
As an indirect eﬀect, capital accumulation raises w and the incentives to save to smooth
consumption. This eﬀect of inflation on capital accumulation is consistent with the data
for low values of inflation as proven in Bullard and Keating [3]. But, unfortunately, welfare
analyzes can not be performed analytically because of the various general equilibrium eﬀects
at stake. Instead, I provide a simple calibration.
5.2 Calibrated CES Utility function
I simulate the model with a standard calibration. α = 0.33;β = 0.96;σ = 1;ω = 0.99; η =
0.39. These parameters are standard values taken from Chari et al. [4]. The only diﬀerence
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is that the coeﬃcient ω is equal to 0.94 in their simulation whereas I take the value 0.99 to
obtain a smaller and more realistic quantity of money on GDP (it is around 30% here). Fig.
1 plots the equilibrium real interest rate in percent as a function of the net inflation rate in
percent. It has been checked that the condition 1Π < R <
1
β is fulfilled for the whole range
of parameters.
1 2 3 4 5 6
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
1 2 3 4 5 6
-1.662
-1.658
-1.656
-1.654
-1.652
-1.65
-1.648
Fig.1 : Real interest rate as a function of
the net inflation rate, both in percent
Fig. 2 : Utility of H and L households
as a function of inflation
Fig. 1 shows that the real interest rate is a decreasing function of the inflation rate. One
can check that mL−mH is increasing in Π, what increases the resources of H households to
save. When inflation increases from 2% to 3%, the capital stock increases by 0.12%. Fig. 2
plots u
¡
cH ,mH
¢
and u
¡
cL,mL
¢
as a function of inflation, the solid line and the dashed line
respectively2. The utility of both agents decreases because of the decrease in money demand
induced by higher inflation. The utility of H agents decreases more sharply because of the
higher decrease in money holdings. Hence, although inflation increases capital accumulation,
it decreases welfare.
2 Intertemporal welfare of H households is simply
¡
u
¡
cH ,mH
¢
+ βu
¡
cL,mL
¢¢
/
¡
1− β2
¢
and the in-
tertemporal welfare of L households is defined the same way. The discussion of period utility exhibits more
sharply the various eﬀects.
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A Solution to the Problem of the Households
Using the Bellman equations, the problem of the households can be written in a recursive
form. Stationary solutions satisfy, of course, the usual transversality conditions. As a
consequence, one can focus on the first order condition of the problem of the households.
This one is
V
¡
qit, e
i
t
¢
= max
{cit,mit,ait+1}
u
¡
cit,m
i
t
¢
+ βV
¡
qit+1, e
i
t+1
¢
cit +m
i
t + a
i
t+1 = q
i
t + wte
i
t +
µit
Pt
(14)
qit+1 = Rt+1a
i
t+1 +
mit
Πt+1
(15)
cit,m
i
t, a
i
t+1 ≥ 0 (16)
with q11, q
2
1 given and with the deterministic change of state e
i
t+1 = 0 if e
i
t = 1, and e
i
t+1 = 1
if eit = 0. Using (14) and (15) to substitute for c
i
t and q
i
t+1, one can maximize only on a
i
t
and mit. Using the first order conditions, together with the envelop theorem (which yields
in all cases V 0
¡
qit, e
i
t+1
¢
= u0c
¡
cit,m
i
t
¢
), one finds
u0c
¡
cit,m
i
t
¢
= βRt+1u
0
c
¡
cit+1,m
i
t+1
¢
(17)
u0c
¡
cit,m
i
t
¢
− u0m
¡
cit,m
i
t
¢
=
β
Πt+1
u0c
¡
cit+1,m
i
t+1
¢
(18)
If the previous equations yield a quantity ait+1 < 0, then the borrowing constraint is binding
and the solution is given by ait+1 = 0 and u
0
c
¡
cit,m
i
t
¢
> βRt+1u0c
¡
cit+1,m
i
t+1
¢
together with
(18). In a stationary equilibrium, all H agents become L agents the next period, and the
reverse. The H agents are the high revenue agents, and their savings are always higher than
the ones of L agents, who have no labor income. As a consequence, credit constraints never
bind for H agents. One can rewrite the previous equations using the state of the households
instead of their type. In a stationary equilibrium it yields the expressions given in section 3.
B Proof of Proposition 2
I first assume that credit constraints are binding and I exhibit the condition under which it
is eﬀectively the case. First the equalities (9) and (13) imply that cH/cL = ψ (R,Π) with
ψ (R,Π) ≡ β− 1σR− 1σ
⎛
⎜⎝
1 +
¡
1−ω
ω
¢η ³
1− β
2R
Π
´1−η
1 +
¡
1−ω
ω
¢η ¡
1− 1ΠR
¢1−η
⎞
⎟⎠
1− 1−σσ 1η−1
For a given Π the function ψ (R,Π) is continuous for R ∈ ( 1Π ;
1
β ]. And ψ
³
1
β ,Π
´
= 1. If η < 1
then limR−→ 1Π ψ
¡
1
Π ,Π
¢
= β−
1
σΠ
1
σ
µ
1 +
¡
1−ω
ω
¢η ³
1− β
2
Π2
´1−η¶1− 1−σσ 1η−1
> 0. If 1 < η < 1σ
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then 1− 1−σσ
1
η−1 < 0 and limR−→ 1Π ψ
¡
1
R ,Π
¢
= +∞. As a consequence, under the condition
of proposition 2, the ψ (R,Π) is positive and bounded away from 0 when R approaches 1Π .
Second, using the budget constraints (7) and (8) to substitute for 1/cL, one finds that
(recall that aL = 0)
cH
cL
+
mH
cH
cH
cL
− m
L
cL
=
w − aH
RaH
µ
1 +
mL
cL
− m
H
cH
cH
cL
¶
with the Cobb-Dougglas production function and asK = aH , one finds w−a
H
RaH = α
−1−R−1−
1. Then, substituting mH/cH , mL/cL and cH/cL by their expressions given respectively by
(13) and cH/cL = ψ (R,Π) one finds the implicit relationship between R and Π : ∆ (R,Π) =
Θ (R) where Θ (R) ≡ α−1 −R−1 − 1 and where
∆ (R,Π) =
Ã
1 +
µ
1
α
− 1
R
¶µ
1− ω
ω
¶η µ
1− 1
ΠR
¶−η!
ψ (R,Π)
−
µ
1
α
− 1
R
¶µ
1− ω
ω
¶η µ
1− β
2R
Π
¶−η
For a given Π, the function ∆ (R,Π) and Θ (R) are continuous as a function of R ∈ ( 1Π ;
1
β ].
One can check that ∆
³
1
β ,Π
´
= 1. As
¡
1
α −Π
¢
> 0 and as ψ (R,Π) is positive and bounded
away from 0 when R −→ 1Π , one finds that limR−→ 1Π ∆
¡
1
R ,Π
¢
= +∞.
The definition of Θ yields Θ
³
1
β
´
= 1α−β−1 and Θ
¡
1
Π
¢
= 1α−Π−1. Under the condition
α < 12+β one finds that Θ
³
1
β
´
> 1. To summarize these findings limR−→ 1Π ∆ (R,Π) >
limR−→ 1Π Θ (R) and ∆
³
1
β ,Π
´
< Θ
³
1
β
´
. By continuity of the function of R, ∆ (R,Π) and
Θ (R) one finds that there is at least one value 1Π < R
∗ < 1β such that ∆ (R
∗,Π) = Θ (R∗) .
R∗ is an equilibrium interest rate of the credit constrained economy.
It is easy to prove that inflation aﬀects real variables and that the result of Sidrauski
[12] does not hold when credit constraints are binding. The proof is made by contradiction.
Assume that cH , cL, aH , R and w are not aﬀected by inflation. Then, equality (8) yields
mH −mL = cL −RaH . As a consequence, if inflation is neutral then the right hand side is
constant when inflation varies, and so is the left hand side. Thus, one must have ∂m
H
∂Π =
∂mL
∂Π :
Inflation must aﬀect symmetrically the money demand of all agents. But, using (13), one
can substitute for mH and mL and one finds that if inflation is neutral, thenµ
1− β2R2
z
+ β2R2
¶−(1+η)
=
1
β2R2
cH
cL
where the new variable z ≡ 1− 1ΠR is increasing in Π. The left hand side is decreasing in z
and hence in Π, because βR < 1 and the right hand side is constant, what is a contradiction
(the previous equality can not be true for two diﬀerent values of Π). As a consequence,
inflation can not be neutral or, in other words, money is not superneutral.
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C The Cobb-Douglas Case
The ratios m
H
cH and
mL
cL are given by (13) with η = 1. The value of
cH
cL is given by
cH
cL =
ψ˜ (R,Π) where
ψ˜ (R,Π) ≡ (βR)−
1
σ
Ã
1− β
2R
Π
1− 1ΠR
!(1−ω) 1−σσ
One easily gets ψ˜
³
1
β ,Π
´
= 1 and limR−→ 1Π
+ ψ˜ (R,Π) = +∞. One can show that the
derivative ψ˜
0
1 (R,Π) < 0 and that ψ
0
2 (R,Π) < 0. Moreover, ψ˜ (R,Π) > 1 for R ∈ ( 1Π ;
1
β ].
The implicit relationship between Π and R can be written has ∆˜ (R,Π) = Θ (R), and
where
∆˜ (R,Π) =
µ
1 +
1− ω
ω
1
α
R− α
R− 1Π
¶
ψ˜ (R,Π)− 1− ω
ω
1
α
1− αR
1− β2RΠ
As before, ∆˜ (R,Π) is a continuous function of R for R ∈ ( 1Π ;
1
β ]. One can show that
limR−→ 1Π ∆˜ (R,Π) > limR−→ 1Π Θ (R) and that ∆˜
³
1
β ,Π
´
< Θ
³
1
β
´
under the condition of
proposition 3. As a consequence, there is a R∗ ∈ ( 1Π ;
1
β ] such that ∆˜ (R
∗,Π) = Θ (R∗).
Uniqueness stems from the variation of ∆˜ (R,Π) when R ∈ ( 1Π ;
1
β ]. First, one can prove
that ∆˜01 (R,Π) < 0. Indeed, the fraction
¡
1− αR
¢
/
³
1− β
2R
Π
´
is increasing in R. and the
fraction R−α
R− 1Π
is positive and decreasing in R because it has been assumed that R > 1/Π > α.
As a consequence, the function ∆˜ (R,Π) is unambiguously decreasing in R, because ψ˜ (R,Π)
is decreasing in R. As the function Θ (R) is increasing in R, the equation ∆˜ (R,Π) = Θ (R)
has at most one solution, what proves uniqueness.
Then, one can prove that ∆˜02 (R,Π) < 0. Indeed,
∆˜02 (R,Π) =
1− ω
ω
1
α
(R− α)
Ã
β2¡
Π− β2R
¢2 − ψ˜ (R,Π)(RΠ− 1)2
!
+
µ
1 +
1− ω
ω
1
α
R− α
R− 1Π
¶
ψ˜
0
2 (R,Π)
As ψ˜
0
2 (R,Π) < 0 and as R > α, a suﬃcient condition to get the result is
β2
(Π−β2R)2 −
ψ˜(R,Π)
(RΠ−1)2 < 0. But as ψ˜ (R,Π) > 1, this is always true because Rβ < 1. As a consequence,
by the theorem of the implicit function one gets ∂R
∗
∂Π =
∆˜02(R,Π)
Θ0(R)−∆˜01(R,Π)
< 0, which concludes
the proof of the proposition.
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